Attacks on Iranian gas lines effective, but not enough - opinion

• Published date: 24 March 2024
• Author: FARHAD REZAEI
• Publication title: Jerusalem Post, The: Web Edition Articles (Israel)

Despite the clear impact, Iranian officials hesitated to point fingers, even as Western sources attributed the blasts to Israel. This incident, followed by subsequent disruptions at the Bandar Abbas Aftab oil refinery and other key sites, reveals a strategic vulnerability

For Israel, this marks a critical moment to assess the broader consequences of these actions and the apparent reluctance of the Iranian regime to escalate tensions by assigning blame.

To understand why Tehran dispensed with its usual fire and brimstone threats against the "Zionist enemy," a summary of the decades-long shadow war between the two countries is in order.

From its revolutionary start in 1979, the regime has viewed the eradication of Israel, also known as "Little Satan," and the creation of a Palestinian state from the "river to the sea" to be a religious and political imperative. With few military resources to take on a regular army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) has encouraged several – mostly Shia – militias known as the "axis of resistance."

Iran's proxies, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Houthis, and the Iran-aligned forces in Syria, were to serve as the "ring of fire" around Israel. In other words, they could be unleashed in a coordinated move, according to the regime's needs.

In response, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) developed the containment doctrine known as MABAM, a Hebrew acronym for "war between wars." According to the former chief of staff, Gen. Aviv Kochavi, the Israeli military sought to prevent a larger conflagration by localized retaliation against the offending proxy or proxies.

Although the IDF targeted Iranian nuclear scientists and IRGC forces attached to militias in Syria and elsewhere, a direct strike on Iranian infrastructure and facilities was ruled out. For instance, between 2010-2012, when the Netanyahu government discussed bombing Iran's nuclear sites in Natanz and Fordo, the idea was overruled by the military.

Naftali Bennett, who became prime minister in 2020, challenged the notion that it was too risky to take on Iran directly. In a well-publicized round of interviews, he called for implementing the Octopus Doctrine: Rather than going after the Octopus's militia tentacles, Israel should cut off the head, Iran.

Bennett argued that the previous doctrine was not likely to deter the regime which, despite its lavish praises for the "brothers" of the "axis of resistance," considered them hardly more than cannon...